TERRORIST Insurance Arranging Utilizing A RELATIVE Danger Diminishment APPROACH

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Fear based oppressor PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH Joseph P. Indusi, Chair Nonproliferation & National Security Department Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, NY 11973 Presented at: 19 TH Annual National Defense Industrial Association Security Technology Symposium & Exhibition June, 2003 Reston, VA

TERRORIST PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH (Continued) CLASSICAL RISK FORMULA USED IN REACTOR SAFETY STUDIES AND OTHER SYSTEMS (1) R = P x C WHERE R = RISK P = PROBABILITY OF EVENT C = CONSEQUENCES OF EVENT

TERRORIST PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH (Continued) SOCIETAL RISK APPROACH FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS SAFEGUARDS (2) R = Pa x (1 – Pi) x C WHERE Pa = PROBABILITY OF ATTEMPT BY ADVERSARY Pi = PROBABILITY OF ADVERSARY INTERRUPTION (BY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM) C = CONSEQUENCES

TERRORIST PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH (Continued) MAIN DIFFICULTY IS IN ESTIMATING PROBABILITY OF ATTEMPT, Pa IN EQUATION (2), DENOTE Pa AS THREAT, (1-Pi) AS VULNERABILITY, C AS CONSEQUENCES, GIVING R = THREAT x VULNERABILITY x CONSEQUENCES

TERRORIST PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH (Continued) RISK IS A FUNCTION OF THE POTENTIAL THREAT, VULNERABILITY TO THE THREAT, AND THE CONSEQUENCES IF THE THREAT IS CARRIED OUT. BY CONSIDERING ALL THREE ELEMENTS, A HIGH RISK DENOTES A PLAUSIBLE THREAT SCENARIO, A TARGET WHICH IS VERY VULNERABLE TO THE THREAT SCENARIO, AND A SEVERE SET OF CONSEQUENCES IF THE THREAT IS CARRIED OUT.

Relative Ranking Scales - Examples We may utilize a relative numerical positioning scale for the dangers and vulnerabilities for every potential risk objective. A case: 10 = high danger, most prominent defenselessness 3 = medium level dangers and weakness 1 = low risk, not powerless

TERRORIST PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH (Continued) "THE ASSETS, FUNCTIONS, AND SYSTEMS WITHIN EACH CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR ARE NOT EQUALLY IMPORTANT" – NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, JULY 2002. Helplessness ASSESSMENTS ARE DEVELOPED USING AN IMPLICIT THREAT SCENARIO, BUT PROBABLY ONLY ONE AND NOT A RANGE. Constructing UPGRADES In light of ONLY ONE OR TWO ELEMENTS OF RISK DOES NOT OPTIMIZE USE OF RESOURCES. SECURITY UPGRADES IN SOME AGENCIES IN THE PAST WERE DRIVEN BY VULNERABILITIES OR CONSEQUENCES ALONE.

TERRORIST PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH (Continued) "Likewise, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL APPLY A CONSISTENT METHODOLOGY TO FOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON THE HIGHEST PRIORITIES… " - NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, JULY 2002. Utilizing DESIGN BASIS THREATS CAN LEAD TO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. COMPUTATIONAL METHODS AND/OR EXPERT JUDGMENT ARE CAPABLE OF REASONABLY ACCURATE ESTIMATES OF CONSEQUENCES AND VULNERABILITIES. THE THREAT ELEMENT IS THE MOST DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE.

TERRORIST PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH (Continued) OF COURSE, WITH PERFECT INTELLIGENCE, THE THREAT CAN BE NEUTRALIZED. IN THE ABSENCE OF RELIABLE THREAT INTELLIGENCE WE MUST ACT PRUDENTLY TO USE RESOURCES FOR HIGHEST RISK SCENARIOS AND TARGETS. WE BEGIN THE PROCESS WITH THE THREAT ELEMENT: THE THREAT IS DEVELOPED AS A THREAT SCENARIO AGAINST A TARGET OR FACILITY. "MAPPING TERRORIST THREATS… AGAINST SPECIFIC FACILITY SECTORAL VULNERABILITIES WILL ALLOW AUTHORITIES TO DETERMINE… WHICH FACILITIES AND SECTORS ARE MOST AT RISK" - NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, JULY 2002.

Threat Targets Chemical Biological Nuclear

EVOLVING TARGETS

TERRORIST PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH (Continued) THREAT SCENARIOS ARE DEVELOPED IN A BRAINSTORMING OR GROUP EFFORT FOR EACH FACILITY OR TARGET. Require PARTICIPANTS FROM MANY DISCIPLINES AND An UNBIASED FACILITATOR. Require HISTORIANS, SPECIAL OPERATIONS OR SIMILAR CAPABILITIES, TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON THE FACILITIES, NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOWEAPON EXPERTS, INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS, ETC. THE THREAT SCENARIOS MAY BE ORDERED IN SOME RELATIVE RANKING FROM MOST PROBABLE TO LEAST PROBABLE.

TERRORIST PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH (Continued) THE RELATIVE RISK RANKING BEGINS WITH THE LIST OF THREAT SCENARIOS VERSUS TARGETS OR FACILITIES. FOR EACH SCENARIO/TARGET ELEMENT, THE VULNERABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES ARE ESTIMATED. Assessments CAN BE QUALITATIVE (HIGH, MED, LOW) OR QUANTITATIVE STATEMENTS ON THE VULNERABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES. THE RESULTS ARE ORDERED FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST PRODUCING A RELATIVE RISK RANKING.

TERRORIST PROTECTION PLANNING USING A RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION APPROACH (Continued) RESOURCES ARE USED TO REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY OR MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE HIGH RISK SCENARIOS. AFTER UPGRADES ARE COMPLETED, THE RELATIVE RISK RANKING WILL CHANGE, HENCE THIS IS NOT STATIC, BUT MUST BE UPDATED. THIS APPROACH WAS USED BY BNL MANAGEMENT TO SCHEDULE SECURITY UPGRADES FOR ALL MAJOR BNL FACILITIES. "Ensuring AMERICAS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES THUS REQUIRES THAT WE DETERMINE THE HIGHEST RISKS… " - NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, JULY 2002.