Siting of Hazardous Industries Role of Risk Analysis

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Limit Building Program on "New Procedures and Techniques in Aversion and Administration of Mechanical Calamities" to the Karnataka Processing plant Inspectorate 23-24 Oct 2010. Siting of Perilous Commercial ventures

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Limit Building Program on "New Techniques and Strategies in Prevention and Management of Industrial Disasters" to the Karnataka Factory Inspectorate 23-24 Oct 2010 Siting of Hazardous Industries – Role of Risk Analysis ORGANIZERS Karnataka State Safety Institute ® Department of Factories, Boilers, Industrial Safety & Health, Bengaluru SPONSORS Dr. A. Koshy 23 Oct 2010, Bengaluru , Karnataka

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Concerns and issues in Siting/Layout Strategic Principles in the assurance of safe area and design for another or a development extend Key data to be considered before choosing a site area How are siting issues overseen when restricted space is accessible? How are security worries in another site tended to ?

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An Ideal Situation A site area and format that will limit hazard to the encompassing and group/work force and property while boosting the simplicity of safe operation and upkeep. Suitable siting and design builds up an establishment for a protected and secure operation.

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Hazard Management in Life Cycle of an Engineering Project Site Lay-out of establishment

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Hazard Techniques for Site assessment Techniques of Fire Explosion Index and Toxicity Index Dow's Index Mond's Index Codes ( OISD) Allowing target dividing separations to be considered at all stages

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Major Accident Hazard Group "Real mischance" implies an episode including loss of life inside or outside the site or at least 10 wounds inside and/or at least one wounds outside or release of dangerous concoction or blast or fire or spillage of perilous chemicals bringing about 'on location' or 'off-site' crises or harm to hardware prompting to stoppage of process or antagonistic impacts to nature. THE MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD CONTROL RULES, 1997

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Features of Well Laid out Site The potential for dangerous effects, fire acceleration, and blast harm will be low. The hazard to staff and the encompassing group will be decreased. Upkeep will be less demanding and more secure to perform. Be that as it may, these advantages don't come without related expenses. Detachment separations mean land that costs cash.

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Some key mechanical mishaps Flixborough (6/74) 28 fatalities - $167MM Seveso (7/76) Contaminated field Mex. City (11/84) 550+ fatalities - $26MM Bhopal (12/84) 3M+ fatalities - 200M influenced Chernob. Nuc. Plt. (4/86) 31 fatalities - 300 mi 2 cleared Piper Alpha Plat. (7/88) 165 fatalities Pasadena, Tx. (11/89) 23 fatalities - $797MM Channelview, Tx. (7/90) 17 fatalities - $14MM Pemex, Mexico (7/96) Multiple fatalities - $253MM, $8MMM misfortune to economy Petrobras, Brasil (6/2001) 10 fatalities - $300MM Toulouse, France (9/01) 29 fatalities, 20,000 homes harmed * Large property harm misfortunes (seventeenth version); M&M Protection Consultants; 1166 Avenue of the Americas, NY, NY 10036

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Explosion at Chemical office Flixborough, England, 1974

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Explosion at Chemical office Flixborough, England, 1974 A huge amount of cyclohexane vapor was discharged when a 20" " alternative " sidestep pipe cracked The cyclohexane framed a combustible blend and accordingly found a wellspring of start. The subsequent huge vapor cloud blast murdered 28 specialists , harmed 36. ( Minimized as the workplace piece was vacant )

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Damages ( Onsite and Offsite) 18 fatalities happened in the control room subsequently of the windows shattering and the fall of the rooftop. Nobody got away from the control room. Fires consumed for a few days and following ten days those that still seethed were hampering the protect work. Offsite results - 53 detailed wounds. Property in the encompassing range was harmed to a fluctuating degree.

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Contributing Factors Not taking after codes & working methods while presenting adjustments configuration codes , administration of progress systems , support methodology amid recommissioning Plant format - position of possessed structures Control Room not intended for withstanding significant perils Emergency arrange not refreshed after alterations UK COMAH direction was presented

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Explosion at Refinery, Pasadena, Texas 23 Oct 1989

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Explosion at Refinery, Pasadena, Texas 23 Oct 1989 During upkeep chip away at a reactor settling leg , a huge arrival of combustible vapor happened at the Phillips 66 synthetic complex . The outcome - a monstrous vapor cloud blast , took after by a progression of further blasts and flames . 23 fatalities and 300 individuals harmed. Broad harm to the plant offices Metal & Debris to the extent 4 Km

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Contributing Factors Site and industry gauges for upkeep not took after Training and fitness Work allow framework - temporary workers Positioning of possessed structures

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Risk Factors in Site Selection Risk to Population thickness around the site ( from decision unsafe material, gear , activites) Risk from Natural fiasco event (quake, surge, and so forth.) Risk of non-accessibility of force, steam and water

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Plant Siting Safety Considerations Buffer zone Location of different dangerous establishments in region Inventory of poisonous and perilous materials Adequacy of firefighting water supply Access to Emergency hardware Availability of crisis reaction bolster from nearby ventures and the group Weather extremes and winning winds Location of roadways, conduits, railroad and plane hallways Environmental and waste transfer limitations amid crises Draining and level slant Maintenance and assessment

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Layers of Safety in Industrial Project

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Critical Radiation Levels

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Damage Criteria for Explosion

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Damage Contours from Pool terminate at complex

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Radiation Level Ellipse @ 4 kW/m2 Effect Zone @ 4 kW/m2 Ellipse @ 12.5 kW/m2 Effect Zone @ 12.5 kW/m2 Damage Contours from Jetfire at tank cultivate

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Damage Contours from VCE

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Toxic Dispersion & Effects Vapor mists may offer ascent to vast fires, blasts or lethal impacts. Different things being equivalent, harmful gas mists are probably going to be perilous at significantly more prominent separations from the purpose of discharge than their combustible partners. Scattering is the procedure through which gasses can travel long separations. Two sorts of scattering happen in mechanical circumstances.

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Types of Dispersion A refinement between various sorts of scattering is made for the utilization of appropriate models. It depends on the sort of material Dispersions Dense Neutral

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Consequences from Toxic Gas Dispersion An extensive poisonous discharge may offer ascent to the accompanying impacts on individuals: deadly damage non-deadly harm Irritation Toxic gas discharges may bring about domino impacts by rendering nearby plants inoperable and harming administrators. Counteractive action/moderation by arrangement of programmed control frameworks utilizing innately more secure standards and an appropriate control room

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Large Toxic Release The principle method of presentation is inward breath The impacts of a lethal discharge are evaluated knowing the connection between the focus time profile and the level of harm The item C of fixation and the season of introduction t, is called measurements and is straightforwardly ascertained from the scattering condition

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Exposure Limits Three organizations give data with respect as far as possible, indicating safe levels of air borne contaminants OSHA The National Institute of Occupational Safety (NIOSH) and The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) These 3 offices have set up rules and particular presentation levels of different contaminants

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Protection from Domino/Cascade Effects Arranging detachment separations to such an extent that harm to adjoining plants won't happen even in the most pessimistic scenario; Provision of obstructions e.g. impact dividers, area in solid structures; Protecting plant against harm; e.g. arrangement of thicker dividers on vessels; Directing blast alleviation vents far from helpless ranges; e.g. different plants or structures, roadways close site limits. Be that as it may, these measures may not give commonsense arrangements against rockets, and hazard examination might be required to demonstrate sufficient wellbeing.

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LPG Terminal Mexico City, Mexico 1984 A noteworthy fire and a progression of calamitous blasts happened at the PEMEX LPG Terminal. After the intial discharge , the main BLEVE happened . For the following a hour and a half, a progression of BLEVEs took after as other LPG vessels brutally detonated . Approximetly 500 individuals were slaughtered and the office was demolished .

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Contributing Factors Plant format - the situating of vessels Emergency disengagement Survivability of basic frameworks Emergency plan and site get to

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Guidance values for safe partition separations For counteractive action of Domino Effects Thermal radiation from flame (Jet/Flash/Pool/Fireball) 12.5 kW/m 2 1% Fatality level 4.5 kW/m 2 Safe for firefighters Overpressure from Explosion (UVCE/VCE/BLEVE) 0.1 bar 1% Fatality level

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Site Factors to be considered where Risks of arrival of combustible/dangerous materials exists Plants/Flammable stockpiles ought to be sited in the outdoors Locating all high-volume stockpiling of combustible/harmful material well outside process territories; Hazardous region grouping (HAC) to assign regions for end of start sources . Finding dangerous plant far from principle roadways through the site; Fitting remote-incited disengagement valves where high inventories of risky materials might be discharged into defenseless zones; Provision of trench, dykes, bank