# Noncooperative Market Games in Normal Form Cournot model of amount rivalry Stackelberg model of amount competit

1 / 14
0
0
1291 days ago, 524 views
PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Noncooperative Business sector Recreations in Ordinary Structure Cournot model of amount rivalry Stackelberg model of amount rivalry Bertrand model of value rivalry . Amount Rivalry between Two Firms Rivalry utilizing amount named after Cournot harmony lies between imposing business model

### Presentation Transcript

Slide 1

﻿Noncooperative Market Games in Normal Form Cournot model of amount rivalry Stackelberg model of amount rivalry Bertrand model of value rivalry

Slide 2

Quantity Competition between Two Firms Competition utilizing amount named after Cournot balance lies amongst imposing business model and impeccable rivalry

Slide 3

Monopoly Consider the accompanying interest, opposite request, and cost capacities: Than we can record the benefit work as: Profit-amplifying yield level can be discovered utilizing FOC

Slide 4

Cournot Duopoly Modified request, backwards request, and cost capacities: Than we can record the benefit work as: Profit-augmenting yield level can be discovered utilizing FOC Using symmetry:

Slide 5

Cournot Oligopoly Modified request, converse request, and cost capacities: Than we can record the benefit work as: Profit-expanding yield level can be discovered utilizing FOC Using symmetry:

Slide 6

x 2 ( a-bc ) 0.5( a-bc ) ( a-bc ) 0.5( a-bc ) x 1 Graphic arrangement of the Cournot Duopoly amusement From the main request states of the Cournot Duopoly (slide 5): From which:

Slide 7

What if firms #1 can move initial: 1. Will it do it or hold up and a) moves at the same time with #2 b) moves after #2 2. What are the relating yields? (the same as in Cournot?) 3. Who blades and who looses (#1, #2, purchasers) ?

Slide 8

Stackelberg Equilibrium Firm #1 picks its yield to begin with, realizing that Firm #2 will pick its yield utilizing its best reaction work: Now we can change benefit capacity of Firm #1: FOC:

Slide 9

Why firm #1 can't accomplish an indistinguishable harmony under Cournot from it can under Stackelberg? Who balances and who looses under Stackelberg contrasted with Cournot (#1, #2, customers) ?

Slide 10

Duopoly with various expenses From the FOC: Conclusions? Impact of the administration endowment?

Slide 11

Oligopolistic rivalry with free section Recall: Number of firms with zero settled expenses? Settled cost = F Number of firms? Total yield: Aggregate request: Price: Firm's benefit:

Slide 12

Free Entry = Zero Profit

Slide 13

Bertrand show Assumptions: Firms contend by picking costs Each firm has boundless limit Consumers respond even to small contrasts in costs Algebraically: The main Nash Equilibrium is: p 1 =p 2 =c

Slide 14

Rank: Cournot (2 firms), Bertrand , Stackelberg, consummate rivalry, and imposing business model For firm #1 For firm #2 For customers