Jere R. Francis Curators Professor and KPMG Distinguished Research Professor, University of Missouri francismissouri

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2. Challenges in Audit Quality Research . Quality (capability/freedom) can\'t be straightforwardly observedThe exemption is

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Jere R. Francis Curators' Professor and KPMG Distinguished Research Professor, University of Missouri Doctoral Consortium "Looking into Audit Quality" For writing survey, see "What do we think about review quality?" British Accounting Review 36 (2004), pp. 345-368.

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Challenges in Audit Quality Research Quality (capability/freedom) can't be specifically watched The exemption is "demonstrated" ex-post review disappointments (extremely uncommon) Auditor decision is endogenous (choice issue) i.e., is review quality the consequence of good reviews or do "great" organizations essentially pick "better" quality evaluators endogeneity/choice is maybe the greatest test Three wide intermediaries for review quality Auditor attributes firm size (huge/little), mark name (B4), industry ability, prosecution and approvals – these measures are related district/unit of examination (worldwide, nation , city/office, accomplice/group) Engagement-particular qualities review/nonaudit expenses (customer impact), examiner graduated class, residency Financial explanation qualities (review results) Is review quality=auditor conservatism, and is this something to be thankful for?

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Genres of Research (integral) Experiments test financial aspects review judgment explore Archival/observational review markets examine Qualitative research field considers socio-authentic reviews Modeling-Analytical reviews Mathematics, financial matters, rationale, reproductions, and so forth

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Units of Analysis Audit testing & prove gathering strategies Auditor judgments about testing/confirm singular evaluators inspectors work in groups Accounting firms inspectors work in firms Publicly recognizable review results review firms issue review reports firms-customers together create inspected money related explanations Audit markets firms work/contend in review markets Regulatory establishments evaluators, firms and markets are liable to controls

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Audit Testing Procedures Purpose Understanding, assessing and enhancing the nature of review testing and proof get-together methods Historical cases Effectiveness of records receivable affirmations Caster (AJPT 1990) [archival working papers] Development of dollar-unit measurable inspecting more productive and viable than traditional examining Current cases How do chance appraisals influence other review testing systems? Deride and Wright (AJPT 1999) [archival working papers] How viable is the new business hazard review philosophy? College of Illinois/KPMG case look into program

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Auditor Judgments Descriptive "focal point" models (1970s) What data signals influence reviewer basic leadership? Heuristics and predispositions (1970s-80s) Are reviewers unique in relation to other leaders? Memory and insight (1990s) What do reviewers know, and why? Some present cases How does "avocation" influence execution quality? How does "responsibility" influence judgment? Do bunches beat people in conceptualizing extortion hazard? new SAS misrepresentation necessity for U.S. evaluators

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Accounting Firms (generally a discovery) Understanding the structure/organization of firms How brought together/decentralized are firms? what amount of self-rule for nearby workplaces/accomplices? a focal issue in Andersen's Enron review asks question, what's the proper unit of investigation? How do accomplices share benefits? substantial v. little pools, granting of association units motivating force impacts? SOX disposed of NAS-based remuneration (strategically pitching) Do firm notorieties (review quality) change crosswise over workplaces? Crosswise over nations? assuming this is the case, why, and what are the results?

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Observable Audit Outcomes Audit reports issued by bookkeeping firms constrained open doors as just 10% are GC reports Audited budgetary explanations mutually delivered by evaluators customers Examples of research inquiries: do review firm attributes (measure, notoriety, district, and so forth.) influence detectable review results? what variables influence adjusted review reports? are altered review reports enlightening? what are the optional/judgmental components of F/S's most influenced by (differential) evaluating?

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Audit Industry & Markets (IO) Why is the business ruled by vast firms? scale economies (Banker et al. JAE 2003) Are there hindrances to passage in reviewing? Are review markets aggressive, or monopolistic? Are there positive overflows in the joint creation of reviews and different administrations? Is there interest for (supply of) differential review quality, and why? organization, flagging, protection, and prosecution stories, If all in all, how are differential reviews estimated, and are review results (e.g., profit quality) distinctive?

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Regulatory Institutions How do proficient bodies & administrative establishments influence reviews and bookkeeping firms? Cases of research inquiries: How do controller (SEC) sanctions influence firms? Wilson & Grimlund (AJPT 1990) How do different controls/establishments influence reviews/firms? e.g. SOX, and part of review boards of trustees How do lawful obligation administrations influence reviews/firms? changes in the U.S. (Lee and Mande AJPT 2003) cross-province investigations of option administrations How might a restriction on nonaudit administrations influence reviews? numerous present reviews on nonaudit administrations/evaluator freedom How have mergers/unions influenced reviews/industry?

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Good Research Questions What is the review's exploration address? Ought to be obviously expressed on first page (title, 1 st sentence?) Introductions ought to be 2-3 pages max (straightforward diagram) Who considerations, and why? Answers a basic "center question" in the field e.g., is there differential inspector notoriety/review quality and how can it influence profit quality? Researches essential open approach issues, e.g., evaluator turn, nonaudit administrations and inspector autonomy Examines "hotly debated issue" e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley (rivalry) Research plan/methodological issues (minimum fascinating) Recognize the constraint of any single review examiner separation (valuing), then confirmation on results (revealing and accumulations conservatism)

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Data Innovation in Empirical Audit Research Key driver is doing what you appreciate, and finding the correct information Novel information sources Use new information to reply "old" inquiries better or to reply "new" inquiries that couldn't already be explored open information – new U.S. review charge information dangerous as a result of rivalry private information accumulation hazardous on the grounds that expensive and result is obscure Novel utilization of existing information sources (most reviews) Creatively utilizes existing information in new ways connect money related articulations (irregular gatherings) with evaluator qualities Becker et al. (Auto 1998), Francis et al. (AJPT 1999) city-level unit of investigation Francis et al. (Math device 1999), Reynolds &Francis (JAE 2000)