Changing the SMA Paradigm

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Changing the S&MA Paradigm Marshall Space Flight Center HRC INCOSE Meeting Sept. 21, 2006 Roy W. Malone, Jr., Director Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA)

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Overview Marshall Space Flight Center Creating the S&MA Paradigm Root Causes Changing the S&MA Paradigm S&MA Professional Development Roadmap Process The New Vision Safety & Mission Assurance

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Creation of the Paradigm Marshall Space Flight Center Following the Space Shuttle Challenger mischance, the Rogers Commission reported in 1986: S&MA was excluded in specialized issue discourses. Deficient S&MA staffing at MSFC – "Decreases in the wellbeing, dependability and quality certification work compel at Marshall and NASA Headquarters have truly restricted capacity in those imperative capacities (security program obligation) to guarantee legitimate interchanges." "An appropriately staffed, upheld, and hearty security association may well have stayed away from these shortcomings (tending to issues inside the S&MA association that added to the Challenger Accident)… ." Safety & Mission Assurance

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Creation of the Paradigm Marshall Space Flight Center Following the Space Shuttle Columbia mishap, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) reported in 2003: "All through its history, NASA has reliably attempted to accomplish reasonable security programs and conform them to the limitations and ideas of evolving spending plans" "The Board trusts that the security association, because of an absence of ability and assets autonomous of the Shuttle Program, was not a compelling voice in talking about specialized issues or mission operations relating to STS-107." Safety & Mission Assurance

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Creation of the Paradigm Marshall Space Flight Center The 2006 NASA Exploration Safety Study (NESS) Team found that NASA " Safety and Mission Assurance is ineffectual in doing its alloted duties as given in the Governance record in numerous, however not all, NASA Centers." They sited: Lack of initiative Lack of unmistakably characterized lines of power for activity Lack of obviously characterized levels of duty regarding SMA necessities Lack of specialized perfection of faculty in the security disciplines Lack of faculty with area learning "The greater part of the above have prompted to absence of companion level regard from automatic and designing staff and has rendered SMA incapable." Safety & Mission Assurance

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Creation of the Paradigm Marshall Space Flight Center Common Themes Lack of assets Lack of autonomy Funding Authority Lack of train and area aptitude Lack of engagement in specialized basic leadership Lack of regard for specialized capacity Safety & Mission Assurance

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Creation of the Paradigm Marshall Space Flight Center ROOT CAUSES INADEQUATE RESOURCES LACK OF INDEPENDENCE LACK OF DISCIPLINE EXPERTISE Safety & Mission Assurance

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Root Causes Inadequate Resources Marshall Space Flight Center Level of Resources S&MA frequently not supported at required levels. S&MA specifically supported by projects and undertakings Requires S&MA to go after financing with designing and program/extend necessities Often observed as overhead to Centers, projects, and ventures Lack of client comprehension of S&MA value S&MA saw as an oversight association Quality of Resources A vocation in S&MA is not more often than not the main decision of NASA's ideal and brightest specialists. S&MA review structure not keeping pace with designing partners. Wellbeing & Mission Assurance

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Root Cause Lack of Independence Marshall Space Flight Center S&MA staffing consulted with and specifically supported by the Programs and Projects. Brought about S&MA being under obligation to projects and ventures for individuals, apparatuses, and travel. Seriously restricted S&MAs capacity to demand necessities on projects and undertakings. Assist obfuscated S&MA lines of power. Security & Mission Assurance

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Root Cause Lack of Discipline Expertise Marshall Space Flight Center S&MA cutting back in the 1990's required Civil Servant designing workforce to end up S&MA generalist to the detriment of teach skill. The S&MA controls of frameworks security, unwavering quality and viability and quality building not typically offered as College degree majors. S&MA train ability must be created/developed by manager. NASA preparing and advancement programs lacking to address S&MA improvement needs. No formal projects for S&MA advancement and capability. Insignificantly staffed S&MA associations needed to pick between taking care of business and giving time to architects to acquire preparing. Insufficient preparing and travel dollars restricted S&MA capacity to finish teach preparing and improvement. Security & Mission Assurance

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Changing the S&MA Paradigm Resources Marshall Space Flight Center S&MA association hoisted from "Office" to "Directorate" level. Added 2 extra SES positions to MSFC S&MA Directorate. Government employee staffing expanded from 102 in FY02 to 156 in 2006. Benefit pools made for S&MA. Included travel and acquisition stores oversaw by S&MA. Assets still consulted with the projects and ventures - yet S&MA given genuine bid power to address setbacks. S&MA review structure conveyed nearer to equality with building. New S&MA Vision made and imparted. S&MA one of a kind train aptitude. S&MAs part of being a piece of the push to discover arrangements. Early S&MA association prompts to enhanced quality, security, and unwavering quality of the outline. Focus Director effectively championed the pivot of a portion of the Center's best architects into S&MA. Security & Mission Assurance

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Changing the S&MA Paradigm Independence Marshall Space Flight Center Service pools made in 2005 to give more freedom to S&MA. Organization encourage transitioning to HQ coordinate subsidizing for S&MA chiefs assigned as a feature of the specialized power. S&MA Technical Authority (TA) right now being characterized and regulated. Will make a solid harmony between S&MA TA, Engineer TA, and Program/Project Management power. S&MA TA will pull up a chair at each level of administration - Level 4 through Level 1. Will furnish S&MA with the power to guarantee S&MA prerequisites are legitimately actualized in all projects and ventures. Wellbeing & Mission Assurance

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Changing the S&MA Paradigm Discipline Expertise Marshall Space Flight Center All S&MA work force required to choose a S&MA train as the essential territory of ability. Proficient Development Roadmaps (PDRMs) made to distinguish and list courses, learning and the experience important to be qualified at the different levels of S&MA teach improvement. Teach Champions built up to prepare and guide S&MA staff in their endeavors to create. Compulsory Discipline working gatherings built up to give a discussion to teach improvement and learning sharing - keep running by Discipline Champions. Security & Mission Assurance

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S&MA Professional Development Flow APPRENTICE Select S&MA Specialty/Discipline & Volunteer to take an interest A p e n d I x A Prepare IDP utilizing Training Roadmap to ID preparing needs EXISTING S&MA PERSONNEL Complete preparing & OJT. Approve information with tutor DETERMINE DISCIPLINE LEVEL (Section 4.2) NOVICE TRANSFEREE Engineer distinguishes and gives confirmation of Roadmap components effectively finished to Supervisor Candidate fulfills essentials (Appendix An) A p e n d I x B Prepare IDP utilizing Training Roadmap to ID preparing needs Complete preparing & OJT. Approve learning with coach FRESH OUTS Supervisor makes proposal with method of reasoning to S&MA Management Team JOURNEYMAN A p e n d I x C Prepare IDP utilizing Training Roadmap to ID preparing needs S&MA Management Team chooses teach level in light of archived proof and Supervisor Recommendation Complete preparing & OJT. Approve information with coach EXPERT Select proper guide CONTINUOUS LEARNING and Mentoring Safety & Mission Assurance

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PDRM Content Marshall Space Flight Center Body: Definitions Process Flow Almost indistinguishable for the three controls: R&M, SS, QE Safety & Mission Assurance

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PDRM Content Marshall Space Flight Center Body: Definitions Process Flow Almost indistinguishable for the three orders: R&M, SS, QE Appendix C: Expert Appendex B: Jouneyman Appendix A: Novice Requirements Training Classes Reference Documents OJT Experiences Safety & Mission Assurance

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PDRM Content Marshall Space Flight Center Body: Definitions Process Flow Almost indistinguishable for the three orders: R&M, SS, QE Appendix C: Expert Appendex B: Jouneyman Appendix A: Novice Requirements Training Classes Reference Documents OJT Experiences Verification Training Dept. Coach Supervisor Safety & Mission Assurance

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PDRM Content Marshall Space Flight Center Body: Definitions Process Flow Almost indistinguishable for the three orders: R&M, SS, QE Appendix D: Application for Certification Validation Champion Supervisor Certification Review Board Appendix C: Expert Appendex B: Jouneyman Appendix A: Novice Requirements Training Claszes Reference Documents OJT Experiences Verification Training Dept. Men

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