Behavioral Safety at the Carrington Site

Presentation Transcript

Behavioral Safety at the Carrington Site From a level to an ice shelf, attempting to maintain a strategic distance from a couple of chasms Peter Webb, HSEQ Manager, Basell Polyolefins Carrington Site

Outline What is behavioral security How we executed a behavioral program Some key learning focuses

Safety … . A pruned history Technological Improvements Management Systems We are here! Occurrences Human Factors TIME

Why Behavioral Safety? It's simply one more apparatus in the human elements tool kit

What does a Behavioral Approach Comprise? All behavioral wellbeing programs have an arrangement of OBSERVATION and FEEDBACK The perceptions should be possible by anyone on anyone It's about individuals conversing with each other about security

The Observation Process Stop and watch Put the individual being seen quiet Explain what you are doing and why Discuss the occupation being completed Observe the work movement for a couple of minutes Praise safe practices Discuss any "at hazard" practices What Why Discuss what the most exceedingly bad outcomes could have been Ask what restorative activity is required Get responsibility to act Finally record the perception - however no names! Perception On the spot Feedback

Why do we carry on the way we do? Values Attitudes Behaviors Our conduct is driven by our mentalities and qualities

What Are Behaviors? Esteem : "I believe wellbeing's essential" Attitude : "I'm going to utilize the right devices for the employment" Behavior : "*$%^&£!!! I've carried the wrong apparatus out with me. Yet, I'm not going to utilize it, since that would be dangerous. I'm going to stroll back to the workshop and get the right one." Our conduct is driven by our states of mind and values

How would you be able to adjust "At Risk" Behaviors? At hazard practices are driven by dispositions and values But you can't adjust individuals' qualities and demeanors specifically … . They are too profound inside us. So you utilize an arrangement of perceptions which address the "at hazard" practices. In the event that you chip away at altering the "at hazard" practices, inevitably the "at hazard" states of mind and values change as well. We used to feel it was protected to ride in an auto without a safety belt.

Modify the conduct and the esteem will take after Value : "I feel uncomfortable and uncovered in my auto without a safety belt" Value : "I feel safe in my auto without a safety belt" Attitude : "Wearing safety belts is pointless" Attitude : "Wearing safety belts is a capable thing to do" Behavior : "I don't wear my safety belt in my auto". Conduct : "I wear my safety belt in my auto". Conduct alteration : You should wear your safety belt, it's the law!

Carrington Site

How could we have been able to we come to BBS 1980's "Frameworks" activities in HSE. Add up to recordable harm rate diminished from ~18 to ~10 wounds per million hours worked. Mid 1990's Safety execution had leveled 1996 got to be mindful of behavioral projects Decision was taken to pilot it on one plant (Styrocell) Engaged BS supplier to help with usage Started with perceptions in January 1997.

BBS Program Carrington execution took after "established" approach ... Ref HSE CRR 430/2002

BBS Program Some specifics of our execution: List of basic practices Developed by inspecting close miss reports. Follow up We don't sit tight for patterns to create. We follow up on the person at dangers - organized short rundown. Offices versus conduct We don't constrain the at dangers to conduct related We permit at dangers which are identified with the offices too The most imperative thing is that individuals are doing the perceptions eye to eye

BBS Program Styrocell program was an extraordinary achievement. Incredible eagerness among/(sufficiently most) specialists. Program was taken off to rest of site in 1997/8. Directing gatherings set up in each dept Separate rundown of basic practices in each dept Cross site facilitators bunch Approx 10 - 15% of workforce were eyewitnesses (now it's 100% or more contractual workers) A great deal of innovativeness and vitality put into it

Total Recordable Injury Rate (per 10 6 hrs) > 18 Before 1990 BBS presented

Resuscitation In 1999 it was clear there were issues Fall off in perceptions Technicians were stating: "similar perceptions are being done on similar undertakings" "Individuals can't be pestered" "It's similar individuals being watched constantly" "Perception process is excessively formal" "Carrington is as of now protected, so why trouble?" "What's leaving it?" "Information contribution to database is troublesome"

Resuscitation Managers were stating the same as the specialists, and "There's insufficient noticeable yield." "We require more execution measurements – contact rate, perception quality" "Vision is that everyone should be a spectator." "Entire process needs to end up part of the current HSE framework." "We have to proceed onward from the first idea and make BBS our own."

Resuscitation It was not conveying to its maximum capacity But rather we thought the approach was in a general sense sound So we propelled a "revival" Decision to work without the first BS supplier … .. An agent group recognized 4 issues

Resuscitiation Issue 1: Organization Issue Need to make line managers part of the procedure. Need to coordinate BBS into the site HSE frameworks.

Resuscitiation Issue 1: Organization The BBS association we began with Made up of Managers and professionals Only Technicians

Resuscitiation Issue 1: Organization And the association we changed to … . It's completely incorporated! Directors managers and experts Subgroup made up of Improvement Leader and cell central focuses Key individual Site separated into cells of 6 - 8 individuals Everybody is a spectator, including contractual workers

Resuscitiation Issue 2: Perceptions Issue Overcome the carelessness – "It's as of now safe at Carrington" People don't see the esteem. Reaction At the end of the perception, amid the criticism, if there are "at dangers" to talk about, together concur what was the most exceedingly terrible result which could have happened. Together concur a positioning ( L, M, H ) for the potential result on a characterized scale going from s light harm (medical aid), through to casualty . Inspires individuals to picture what could turn out badly

Resuscitation Issue 3: Reporting Issue Need to haul out learning focuses. Need to offer criticism to spectators. Coordinate into the business – connect with close miss reporting. Reaction Every month … .. General KPI's evaluated by site HSE Council (led by Site Manager) Department HSE advisory groups audit execution against KPI's Cell individuals get a report indicating status of the at dangers

Resuscitation Issue 4: Observations Issue People ought to need to complete perceptions. Need to rearrange the perception procedure. Need to make recording less complex. Reaction Original program outline included an alternate rundown of basic practices in every division Created a non specific rundown to be utilized by everyone Allows any eyewitness to do perceptions anyplace on location The nonexclusive rundown is entirely short, perception time can be as short as 5 minutes Some individuals even do it without the agenda!

Other things we've learned! Key Performance Indicators Currently have 3 KPI's: Number of perceptions , 1 for every individual for every month (all workers and contractual workers) Quality , Percent of perceptions for which the "what" and the "why" are rounded out > 80% Close-out of "High" at dangers, 100% in < 3 months Number of perceptions structures some portion of reward plan 1800 perceptions in 2001, 2400 in 2002 … . We don't have a KPI on % safe! On the off chance that you get 100% safe, does that mean you've at long last made it? A protected work put finally? On the other hand does it mean individuals aren't looking sufficiently hard? With our non specific rundown of basic practices, it's difficult to envision we could achieve 100% safe.

Other things we've learned! Administration Commitment Everybody knows its essential, however what would they be able to do to show it By taking a dynamic premium Management group must be dynamic eyewitnesses Use directors to mentor in the onlooker preparing

Other things we've learned! Hold an away day in a pleasant lodging! Sorted out by the BBS office central focuses Attended by site administration group, cell central focuses, term contractual workers Generated a few activity things for improving the program Demonstrates administration duty, produces smart thoughts, gets purchase in.

Other things we've learned! Authoritative availability Implementing BBS is a major responsibility - you don't need it to fall flat! Authoritative status (atmosphere/culture) is a key variable which impacts probability of achievement. HSE CRR 430/2002 - of 8 suppliers talked with, 3 said they would continue paying little heed to status. To dodge an expensive disappointment, talk about in advance, or direct free culture overview.

Other things we've learned! Can be stretched out to different regions e.g. We have now included ecologically basic practices in the program Is natural insurance gear accessible Is contamination anticipation accomplished Releases controlled Waste discarded properly Energy utilized proficiently

Other things we've learned! Real Accident Hazards Behavioral wellbeing has been driven by harm recurrence Our stock of basic practices was produced by auditing close miss/occurrence reports - > concentrate on work environment security It doesn't take after that a lessening in the dangers because of real mischance perils will happen It relies on upon the rundown of basic practices Here's a case of how BBS added to the real mishap peril chance!

Major Accident Hazards Handle Manlid was utilized for process reasons, as well as w