Aloof Defense Against Nuclear Weapons

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A Fundamental Point. ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON (NW) WILL NOT DESTROY ISRAEL It is not

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Slide 1

Uninvolved Defense Against Nuclear Weapons Facing Up to What People Wish Was Unthinkable Max Singer 9 th Herzila Conference, Feb. 4,2009

Slide 2

A Fundamental Point ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON (NW) WILL NOT DESTROY ISRAEL It is not "all over" if there is an atomic blast. After an atomic blast we will have duties: to spare lives; to secure the nation.

Slide 3

The Message of this Talk Nuclear blast in Israel is conceivable 99% of Israelis survive Survivors have obligations Modest arrangements spare lives

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Sample Threat 1 – 3 weapons Explosive power each = 30,000 tons of high hazardous (30 KT) (half greater than Hiroshima and Nagasaki) Exploded at ground level; along these lines: produces radioactive aftermath (terrible) decreased sweep of impact (great)

Slide 5

Area of Severe or Complete Destruction (focused on Azrieli)

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Effects of one 30 KT Nuclear Bomb (groundburst) Complete devastation or exceptionally extreme harm in hover with range of 1.3 km – region 5,000 dunam Damage brought about by the impact wave from the blast joined with discharge and emanated warm. Number of individuals murdered about equivalent to number in that hover – with territory of 5 sq.km Fatalities outside target circle = Survivors in target circle Worst target – around 70,000 individuals Other targets – around 50,000 individuals

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Possible Fallout Pattern (with high wind)

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Radiation from Nuclear Fallout Will cover a couple of hundred sq. km, where crisis measures will be expected to secure lives (generally leaving) Clean-up will be required before standard utilization of region where there has been aftermath.

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Nuclear Fallout is radioactive clean Goes where wind takes it No tidy, no radiation 200 REM makes you debilitated Radiation measurement rate 1,000 following 1 hour 100 following 7 hours 10 following two days 1 following two weeks

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What Inexpensive Passive Defense Can and Can't Do Not much should be possible to ensure unwarned individuals near where the bomb detonates. Many individuals executed. Few executed 2-5 miles away With ease arrangements there need not be any fatalities from aftermath. Without such arrangements a large number of Israelis could be slaughtered by aftermath Conventional crisis measures thereafter can spare a large number of lives of individuals a mile or so from the blast. With 5-10 minute cautioning existing and characteristic safe house may be utilized to spare 10% - 20% of the general population in the high loss region There will no generous impacts in the majority of the nation and on more than 90% of the general population from a conceivable size bomb.

Slide 11

Main Preparations that Need to be Made Before an Explosion Help individuals figure out how to shield themselves from aftermath. (Essentially by realizing that they need to walk or ride far from where it is.) Arrange for shoddy radiation measurements rate meters and dosimeters to be accessible. (In amounts of a million, meters can be placed in a watch or wireless for a couple of dollars each.) Maintain government projects to tell individuals rapidly after a blast where aftermath has fallen or is coming. Fortify customary putting out fires and other crisis reaction frameworks. Get ready phone, power, and other foundation frameworks to have the capacity to work around neighborhood pulverization. Set up the administration to give skilled initiative to everyone's endeavors to spare those in threat, to deal with the injured, and to limit and conquer physical harm.

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The Usual Excuses for not contemplating what to do about NW It's ideal to avoid atomic blasts – right Even one NW will annihilate the nation – wrong Tens of thousands of dead Israelis are inadmissible (however what do you do in the event that it happens?) It is shocking to ponder such repulsive situations. (Who disclosed to you that you were excluded from thinking about ghastly potential outcomes?) Preparing for NW debilitates discouragement – maybe, yet rather it may fortify prevention Preparing for NW will unnerve individuals and they will clear out.

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More Excuses Who might need to live with the awfulness of so much butcher? (A great many people will like to live.) If a NW detonates where I am there is no other viable option for me. (In any case, an atomic blast will "cover" around 100 sq. km - ½ % of the nation; you'll most likely be elsewhere.) It is egotistical to make arrangements to secure yourself. After an atomic blast such a variety of individuals (and business) will leave Israel that the nation won't be practical.

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Preface An atomic blast in Israel in the following five years is very,very improbable. Significant uses ought to be utilized for other security issues instead of for detached protection. Any atomic weapon detonated in a populated range will be a calamity. Every single conceivable exertion ought to be made to keep any atomic blast in Israel.

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Additional Damage Area of some genuine impact harm - 5,000 dunam - donut shape around primary harm hover Area of slight-direct impact harm - 7,000 dunam - second donut around first sweep 2.4 km. (May incorporate sea range.) Number of fatalities in these regions about equivalent to number of survivors in inward zone of practically entire pulverization

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