9-11 The Response

Presentation Transcript



9-11 The Response Lessons Learned

Acknowledgment Nobody addresses the dauntlessness or the devotion of the people on call who addressed the call to obligation at the World Trade Center on 9-11. In any case, when you lose person on call lives, there is an obligation to scrutinize the arrangements and the operational frameworks of open security organizations with the goal that we don't unnecessarily lose more responder lives in future operations.

Lessons Learned in PREPAREDNESS Planning, Training, Exercising, and Evaluating Plans

Plans, Training, and Exercises New York City did not have, or utilize, ICS. NYC police and fire offices have a long history of free reaction arranging. Fire and police reaction arrangements are not especially perfect.

Plans, Training, and Exercises There were no fire division reaction anticipates various complex occasions . There was no framework for assessing issues connected with multi-complex occasions. (Joint Exercises and Joint AAR) There were no formal fire division arranges at the operational level.

Plans, Training, and Exercises There was an assention (marked in 1993) for flame and police to share police helicopter administrations amid tall building fires, and to prepare together to fight elevated structure fires. There was one known "acquaintance flight" before 9-11. (No record). No joint preparing happened.

Plans, Training, and Exercises Fire division reaction arranges over the "strategic" level are generally taken care of "on-the-fly" with genuine holes in charge and control. "No one had an arrangement." (Aide to Fire Chief executed in the fall of the north tower.)

Plans, Training, and Exercises The assaults surpassed anything crisis organizers had foreseen. (Why?) 1945 Aircraft versus Empire State Building 1993 Bombing of the World Trade Center Disaster penetrates infrequently drew more than 100 firefighters. More than 1000 firefighters reacted to the World Trade Center.

Plans, Training, and Exercises Firefighters who survived, expressed that they went into the towers with no unmistakable mission . NYC people on call don't prepare together, and the fire division does not believe the police.

Plans, Training, and Exercises Fire Department Perception of the Police "Most organizations attempt to be agreeable, useful, however the police have an exceptionally constrained capacity to collaborate." "They answer to no one and they go and do whatever they need." (Chief Turi, NYFD)

Plans, Training, and Exercises Senior Fire Chiefs discussing interagency participation . "There was none." "You will never show signs of change the P.D." "There's a reason people despise cops."

Plans, Training, and Exercises Police Perception of the Firefighters: "In the event that somebody lets them know (firefighters) to accomplish something, they say, 'I don't work for him,' in any case, if a sergeant advises a gathering of cops to hold up, they do." (Lt. John McArdle, Police Emergency Service Unit)

COMMAND Lessons Learned

Command A Unified Command was not set up. Fire Chiefs set up order in the halls of the towers. The police set up summon three squares away at the edge of Church and Vessey Streets.

Command "The police did not attach with the Fire Department, I don't know why" (Thomas Von Essen, Fire Commissioner, 1996 – 2001.) Police and fire supervisors scarcely talked and did not arrange systems .

Command "The Fire Commissioner has constrained power to consider senior fire boss responsible, in light of the fact that they all appreciate Civil Service insurance." (Thomas Von Essen, Fire Commissioner 1996 – 2001.)

CONTROL Lessons Learned

Control Individual firefighters hopped on packed fire trucks against strategy. At the point when requested off of the trucks, they rode to the towers in private autos and on trams. Port Authority cops forsook their posts at scaffolds, passages, and ports.

Control Too numerous firefighters were sent into towers. Numerous firefighters entered without being conveyed. (60 on leave firefighters kicked the bucket). A large portion of the firefighters self-conveyed and circumvent arranging regions . Order did not know which firefighters were in the towers.

Control The Police Department's Emergency Service Unit (ESU) sent groups into both towers. The Police ESU is prepared in protect strategies, and frequently plays out an indistinguishable capacities from firefighters.

Control In the stairwells, fire division and police ESU individuals helped each other convey gear, regulate emergency treatment and pass messages. ESU individuals did not check in with flame administrators who were accountable for the safeguard.

Control We require an a great deal more controlled reaction… since we must be worried about optional occasions. (Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly)

COMMUNICATION Lessons Learned

Communication The fire office radio framework flopped, generally as it did in those same structures eight years prior amid the reaction to the 1993 shelling of the exchange focus. No other organization lost correspondences on September 11 th as comprehensively as did the fire office.

Communication Assistant Fire Chief Donald J. Jones, who had battled the exchange focus fire taking after the besieging in 1993, composed, " Pre-plan and fabricate alternate courses of action." Chief Burns additionally wrote in the 1994 government report, " Our adequacy is just in the same class as our capacity to impart ."

Communication While enroute to the WTC, Chief Burns helped his partners to remember the extreme interchanges issues experienced amid the 1993 reaction to the WTC shelling. On September 11 th , he took summon of operations in the south tower, the second working to be hit however the primary working to disintegrate. Boss Burns was slaughtered when the building caved in .

Communication During the last minutes, most firefighters in the north tower did not realize that the South Tower had disintegrated. Most firefighters in the north tower did not know how critical it was for them to get out.

Communication A repeater introduced at 5 World Trade Center after the 1993 besieging did not seem, by all accounts, to be working, as per the fire division. A post-occurrence survey of tapes decided the repeater was working. (Preparing Issue?)

Communication A fire head landing at the exchange focus attempted to utilize a portable repeater that was situated in his vehicle. He reports that it didn't work. Right on time in 2002, the fire office supplanted old simple radios with computerized radios. The new radios dealt with a higher recurrence and were better at infiltrating structures.

Communication However, a few firefighters said they had been not able impart amid crises, so the computerized radios were pulled from administration in March 2001. They did a reversal to the old radios that years prior to the September 11 th assaults were turned out to be insufficient in the exchange focus.

Communication The fire division tried to make a few changes after the 1993 bombarding, for example, introducing the new repeater at 5 World Trade Center. NYPD and Port Authority police have repeaters like the fire office, and neither one of the agencys experienced huge radio issues on September 11 th . (Preparing/Exercise Issue?)

Communication Some firefighters were on one channel while clearing requests were passed on another channel. Firefighters on higher floors could impart. In any case, various firefighters said they never got the request to leave in light of the fact that the radios were irregular.

Communication One Fire Chief reported that he couldn't converse with the fire dispatcher in light of the fact that an indispensable radio was absent. Telephone lines were stuck. Nobody replied (telephones or radios). At the point when helicopter pilots saw that the north building was close crumple (21 minutes before it fell) their notices achieved police in the city and inside the tower – yet not firefighters.

Communication After years or quibbling, the police and fire organizations did not quarrel on September 11 th . They just did NOT convey . Fire authorities don't know where numerous firefighters kicked the bucket, to a limited extent in light of the fact that the attractive charge sheets used to track organizations were lost in the broken down structures.

INTELLIGENCE Lessons Learned

Intelligence Police and fire directors and chiefs did not share knowledge about building conditions. At the point when radios fizzled, directors neglected to do the one thing that they could do effectively – meet and talk about conditions eye-to-eye.

Intelligence No one in power ever understood that a stairwell was open in the south tower . No less than 18 individuals got away from over the effect zone by method for the stairwell, however expression of their escape course never achieved the several individuals caught above them.

Lessons Learned (Again)

Lessons Leaned (Again) The purview's Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) ought to depict essential capacities and duties regarding each organization (not simply specialist on call offices). It distinguishes lead and bolster organizations for every danger - for both reaction and recuperation operations. (Plan to recoup.)

The Five Basic Assessments of Emergency Management Hazard Assessment Vulnerability Assessment Risk Assessment Capability Assessment Special Needs Assessment

Understand the Differences Hazard – a characteristic or man-brought about event that effects human home . Helplessness – The level of dangerous effect on individuals and property including structures and framework. Chance – Quantification of powerlessness and danger recurrence. (How regularly does it happen?)

Understand the Differences The essential arrangement is an authoritative archive that clarifies how government will